Episcopal Parish Network
Where the Church Gathers

Summary and Transcript
Awareness, Prevention, and Resilience: Understanding Violence Risk in Today's Political Climate
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Summary

EPN recently hosted Tim Kingsley and Christin Kinman for a conversation about keeping churches safe, welcoming, and engaged in ministry during a socially divided election season. Tim presented on behavioral threat assessment and pre-incident indicators, while Christin covered physical security, planning documents, and election-day operations for churches serving as polling places.

Their central message: security is pastoral work. It should protect and sustain radical hospitality and lawful voting, never undermine them.

Key Takeaways

- **Security is pastoral work that protects hospitality and voting.** Christin Kinman and Tim Kingsley framed church security during election season as ministry, not merely risk management. Behavioral awareness and physical safeguards should sustain radical hospitality and lawful voting, never undermine them.
- **Assess behaviors, not identities.** Tim Kingsley explained that threat assessment focuses on observable pre-incident indicators such as leakage, fixation, surveillance, and rehearsal while deliberately avoiding profiling based on ideology, appearance, or disability. He urged parishes to act on the principle that if there is doubt, there is no doubt, often beginning with a simple greeting that both connects and reveals.

- **Build partnerships and exercise plans well before election day.** Christin Kinman recommended inviting local law enforcement and EMS for site visits, establishing clear written agreements with election authorities, and adopting incident command language so every role is unambiguous. She stressed testing communication systems and emergency plans in advance, because finding gaps during a drill is far better than finding them in a crisis.
- **Design the environment to welcome while it protects.** Through crime prevention by environmental design, parishes can improve natural surveillance, control access, and define public and private zones using clear signage, low shrubs, and decorative barriers. Cameras and bollards are useful tools, though cameras should never be aimed at voters or ballots, and the overall posture should remain visibly nonpartisan and inviting.
- **Train volunteers to observe, report, and respond calmly.** Volunteers should know their boundaries, escalate concerns immediately without interpreting election law, and use common incident command terms rather than code words. Confrontational speech and protest are often foreseeable; the guidance is to avoid personalizing the behavior, respond proportionately, and protect voting operations through calm, prepared action.

Transcript

Elizabeth Boe: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Elizabeth Boe, and I am EPN's director of program and strategy. We are really glad that you're here with us this afternoon or that you'll be watching this recording at some point in the near future. This is such a timely conversation for the church to be having as we get closer to election day in November, but also a really helpful conversation in general around security and using our spaces. We are excited to talk about how you can foster safe and welcoming communities while remaining engaged in ministry during a time of social division and how security and preparedness relate to all of that.

We are glad that you're here with us. We would also love to welcome you to EPN 2027 in Denver, February 23rd through 26th. Registration opens on October 14, and there is a lot more information coming soon, so please mark your calendars. Just a few procedural items before I turn it over to Tim and Christin.

First, as you probably know, this is being recorded, and you will all receive an email to your inboxes with the link to the recording and any additional materials within the next 24 to 48 hours. As always, the Q&A function for our webinars is disabled, so please enter your questions and introduce yourselves in the chat, and Tim and Christin will get to those as they have time after the main part of the session. Thank you for being here. I am very happy to introduce the Reverend Tim Kingsley, the vice president of client engagement for Kingswood Security Consulting in Chaska, Minnesota, who was one of our sponsors at EPN 2020, and he will get us started in this conversation. Thank you so much, Tim and Christin, for being with us. And now over to you, Tim.

Tim Kingsley: Well, perfect. It's so nice to be here, and thanks for taking the time today. I can't emphasize enough that these are not topics we think about freely in the church. It's not part of our consciousness to think about safety and security as the primary reason for gathering at church, but I would suggest that safety and security is deeply pastoral and has an opportunity to not only support our ministries, but enhance them.

So, again, thanks for being here today on this call and spending some time with us on this summer day. As shared, my name is Tim Kingsley, and I do serve a security consultancy, but I also serve the Episcopal Church as the director of global risk out of 815 here in New York. So with that, I'll turn it over to Christin for her story.

Christin Kinman: Thank you, Tim. And again, I just want to reiterate everything Tim said. Thank you for joining us. Worship actually holds a very special place near and dear to my heart. I spent almost seven years doing facilities, real estate, and risk for the Archdiocese of Baltimore, which then morphed into the resident security expert for the 50 schools and 200 parishes where I conducted vulnerability assessments and helped get about $4 million worth of grants over a three-year period so that churches have the cash to do the much-needed security improvements.

And to Tim's point about security being something we don't necessarily always think about in the church, and it seems antithetical to our mission, I actually really believe that's not the case. Some of the most pastoral things we can do are to identify people that are in trouble, that need help, and then be able to extend resources to them to ameliorate the pain they're dealing with. So Tim is going to lead us off, and I'm going to go on mute until I come back.

Tim Kingsley: Well, perfect. This time, just sharing my screen real quick and setting the tone. One of the ways I approach the work of safety and security is that something needs to be present before a threat can exist. There's always an opportunity to understand what could be present before a threat could exist if we're brave enough to name those things. Some of the conversations we're going to talk on very briefly at a very high level today is called behavior threat assessment.

Behavior threat assessment is my approach to paying attention to those behaviors in human beings before they manifest harm. Now that's difficult for us from time to time because it's uncomfortable to look at another human being and think of harmful intent. So I will also layer this on top: in the church or in our context of the church, I prefer to think and look at human beings that as they're coming to our faith community, they're seeking grace first, harmful intent second. If behaviors are identified that I know to be consistent with pathways to violence, then those behaviors are what I pay attention to in a term to determine threat or no threat. Behavior threat assessment is the methodology by which I approach the human behaviors that are observable and the circumstances by which I'm observing them.

Context matters. Everybody's context, every faith community's context is going to be different. I had the privilege of serving the cathedral at Saint Mark's in Minneapolis, Minnesota for the past seven years. That context is different from Saint John the Divine, Trinity Wall Street, or any other faith community we might name. The importance is to name the contextual norm of your context and then what behaviors are operating outside of that norm.

Behavior threat assessments are structured, and it's a multidisciplinary process to identify and assess and then manage behaviors that suggest being on a pathway towards targeted violence. Again, coming from the premise that something is present before violence can exist, where are opportunities to first of all name them, identify them, and process them? Our baptismal covenant teaches us to respect the dignity of all persons, trusting that every person is bearing God's image, and we want to welcome everybody to our faith community. We don't want to profile against ideology, identity, who we love, how we dress, a disability, or political expression since we're speaking about voter polling places.

What we do want to profile against, and I do use the words and terminology profiling, we want to profile against behaviors, behaviors that we know to be consistent with people in a pathway to violence. We also want to make sure that we're preserving safe and welcome access, radical hospitality to our faith communities. Lawful voting is important, being a place for people to exercise their civic rights to be able to vote their hearts, their minds, and their beliefs. Churches oftentimes are polling places, and we hopefully will encourage that and continue. We also want to make sure that it's accessible for all people to exercise their civic duties, much like we want to make sure it's accessible for people to worship and to receive pastoral care.

Security measures should be proportionate, not to interrupt those opportunities. Practicing courageous care, the willingness to notice another human being, to seek and serve Christ in all persons, means that we actually have to see another person to be in relationship with them. If we can identify those in crisis or those on a pathway, brave enough to ask them for their help, welcome them openly to our communities. What brings you to Saint Mark's Episcopal Cathedral? Not with humiliation, but with sincere and vigilant interest in that individual. It may just be the opportunity to be in a relationship with somebody that is seeking grace and be able to walk them to a ministry you may offer, or it may be that notification of that individual that you see them conducting perhaps surveillance or rehearsal or whatever the case may be as we unpack some of those pathways later.

Voting is fraught with emotion. Voting is fraught with lines and different personalities and sometimes congestion. All these things create anxiety from time to time. There may be an opportunity for protest at your respective voting and polling stations. People that have alternative beliefs, people that have strong beliefs of a certain candidate or another candidate. Regardless of your political belief, people do have very strong opinions, and we have a very volatile climate in our country right now of different belief systems. You may have demonstrations. You may have people that have confrontational speech. It might be very uncomfortable, it might be unnerving, but that's normal. That is the context for those voting stations.

How do you deal with it? How do you not personalize it? You may have people that are threatening your poll workers or your clergy for your beliefs or your ideology, and you may also have people that want to disrupt the voting process. If you haven't heard of swatting, swatting is when people actually call in law enforcement to say that

there's some sort of behavior to disrupt, and a law enforcement response shows up at your faith community to disrupt the voting process.

This is an example of a protest in a voting location. What you're seeing here is security personnel, and you're seeing a gathering of individuals demonstrating their belief system. This is normal. Now it may be unnerving, it may be something that's uncomfortable, it may disrupt normal operations of the church or the business, but again, this is normal behavior. This is a group of individuals peacefully demonstrating their freedom of speech. They are being observed by security. They may be observed by people within the institution inside those walls or throughout the windows. But the question is, what are they looking for? There's nothing outside the norm within the people that are standing there right now holding up their signs and demonstrating their belief systems.

I encourage you to take a look at this picture, and some of you may recognize it, but this is a picture of the offenders from the Boston Marathon bombing. What stands out in this picture? Take a quick moment to look at it. Group of individuals on a beautiful day celebrating and watching people run the Boston Marathon. What I find interesting is that everybody's attention is focused on the approaching runners. You see them looking down the road other than the police officer who's looking the other direction. You see them looking down the road looking for the runners to come around the corner.

What I find interesting is the two perpetrators, the one in the white hat and the one in the black hat, are looking the opposite direction of the runners. When we're thinking in terms of behaviors that don't fit a contextual norm, the contextual norm would be paying attention to the direction that the runners were approaching. What stands out to me as a security professional is those that aren't joining, aren't paying attention, looking in the opposite way. The question for me now is why? What might I notice? What are they looking at? How might I make contact with them? How might I greet them? In one sentence, in one process, it's to notice, pay attention to other human beings, pay attention to the people that are around you, pay attention to your contextual norm. Understand the changes in personality, the changes in behavior. A meaningful change in a human being, now talking about threat, talking about fixation on a particular ideology or philosophy, possibly leaking information to others. All those can be pre-incident indicators.

Should you hear of somebody having ideation or ideas of harm from another person, there's a responsibility to do something about that information. Share that information, routing information to a designated team of people before you have an event, before you become a polling station, before you have a place of mass gathering, for example, with high publicity. Gather a team of individuals that may triage events that may come about or behaviors that you identify. It's uncomfortable to notice behaviors that are outside the norm, and you shouldn't do it as an island or in a vacuum. Do it with others. We do this ministry in community. So have a designated team called a threat assessment team where you are able to triage what you're seeing, assess what you're seeing, gather and recognize your context. Why is this outside the contextual norm for my faith community? Why is this outside the contextual norm for my polling station?

And then start driving down to what are the reasons that this behavior is existing. Are they conducting rehearsal? Are they conducting surveillance? And then what protective measures might you take into place? Is it a situation where you want to move people away from the polling station? Is it a situation where you want to call the police? Is it a situation where you feel comfortable to walk up to this person and say, what brings you to Saint Mark's Cathedral today? And use proportionate responses.

If you pay attention to the behaviors and pay attention to your contacts and pay attention to the resources you have available to you, you'll be able to manage the response so you don't overreact. But at any time you feel unsafe or anytime there is doubt, I would suggest there is no doubt that you have to do something about what you're observing. Pathways to violence oftentimes start with grievance. I'm unhappy about a decision. I'm unhappy about the election. I'm unhappy about the current administration. Then an individual focuses. Where am I going to make my statement? Where am I going to make my cause? Oftentimes, a person spends time researching and planning. You won't know that because they're spending that time in private. But what will happen before somebody manifests harm is they're going to prepare. They're going to show up at your sites. They're going to do rehearsal. They're going to spend time in your environment.

And oftentimes, that's when somebody's very new to your environment, which is an indicator in and of itself. Greeting the stranger is your first opportunity to confirm or refute concerns. And greeting the stranger is at the very core of who we are as church. We want to greet the stranger with radical hospitality. Behavior indicators that

really merit intention is number one, leakage. Many individuals prior to manifesting their act of violence will share their story. They'll say what they intend to do. They'll say that they have grievance against a certain organization, political party, faith community. If we normalize this conversation, it becomes easier to raise your hand and say, this is what I'm hearing from Tim. This is what I'm hearing from Christin.

Script and validation is what oftentimes the offender is looking to seek. They want to be noticed and they want their story heard. The other thing that's an opportunity for us at our faith communities is this is, again, the pathway and the pre-incident indicators before harm is manifested. A person before manifesting harm will come to your faith communities and do surveillance. They may take photography of your access points. They may take photography of your exit doors. It is contextually normal to come into our beautiful faith communities and take a photo of the baptismal font or take a photo of the altar or take a photo of the pulpit or stained glass windows. What is not contextually normal is when they take photos of the physical plant such as your cameras, your access control, your hours of operation. So pay attention to those things that don't make sense. And, of course, weapons behavior, showing up wearing tactical gear can also be an indication of something that does not make sense in your current environment and really warrants a phone call to law enforcement in a timely fashion.

But again, it has to make sense to your contextual norm. If you are a faith community that caters to the law enforcement community, you may see people with tactical gear, and that is your contextual norm. But pay attention to something that doesn't quite fit right. If it doesn't fit right, if it doesn't feel right, you have a responsibility to do something about it. And again, I use the terminology: if there's doubt, there is no doubt, you must do something with the information you're seeing.

And it may be just as simple as going to your record and saying, I'm not quite sure how to process this. I'm not quite sure what I'm seeing, but it doesn't feel right. Don't do this work alone. Don't do this work on an island. Document the facts. Work from facts and work from understanding behaviors. Not what a person looks like, not who a person loves, not how a person presents, the behaviors that person has presented. If you have a concerning pattern or concerning observation or you see something that is outside the contextual norm and what you know to be a pathway to violence, conducting rehearsal, conducting surveillance, report it. Have a trusted group of individuals to say, I saw this. This is what I'm seeing. This is what I've learned. I want

somebody else to help me and walk with me as I triage and understand these behaviors.

And don't be afraid to contact law enforcement. If you're able to contact law enforcement and trust law enforcement, and I realize from time to time that's difficult, make sure you're explaining what you're seeing in a behavioral tone. Not I noticed somebody that I believe to be strange in my faith community. I noticed somebody to be suspicious. And let me tell you why I believe them to be suspicious. I saw them taking photos of my security cameras, my exit doors, my access control, which I know may be a pre-incident indicator to an act of violence called surveillance. That's going to tell the law enforcement community that you've had some basic training and you're paying attention to threat behaviors vis-a-vis the individual. And have an emergency plan.

Spend time now thinking about what to do if. I do want to teach that we have an opportunity to get upstream. We have an opportunity to interrupt, but that's a longer discussion than 20 minutes on the EPN seminar. If you're brave enough to know what needs to be present before violence can exist, we may have an opportunity to interrupt that violence. And should an event occur, what are we going to do to safeguard our people? What are we going to do to evacuate, shelter in place, and care for the people so we can move towards recovery? Radical hospitality is at our core. Wherever and however you can come alongside your voting and polling and your election judges by having a radical hospitality host, that is your first line of defense to interrupting violence. The government calls it the power of hello. How can I use an open-ended question welcoming you to this faith community that we're so very proud of?

Welcome to Saint Mark's Episcopal Cathedral. What brings you here today? You know that they're coming to vote, but just that open-ended question starts with relationships and brings you into relationship with the person showing up. Have a relationship with your election official, your law enforcement community. And again, if you're able to set a threat assessment team in your organization, have somebody that's going to be an intake for behavior threat assessment so you can triage your observations.

A good response anytime there's conflict is to be calm and use plain language. Focus on the conduct. Avoid the crowds and document exact words when you're having

that conversation with your threat assessment team. What did Christin say and how was it said? What was Christin's behavior? What did you observe? Sorry to pick on you, Christin. As I wrap up the behavior threat assessment section, have a point person, understand that the election officials that are going to be working within your environment, have a relationship with them. They're in charge when it's a polling station, but be in relationship with them. Understand your evacuation routes, where you're going to shelter in place, where you're going to move to.

Train your greeters to be radically hospitable and welcoming to all persons walking in your door. Observe and report anything that's outside of the behavioral norms. With that, I'll turn it over to Christin to talk about some physical security considerations that you may want to consider at your respective faith communities. Christin, can you see your slide? You're on mute, Christin.

Christin Kinman: Okay. Can you hear me now?

Tim Kingsley: Yes.

Christin Kinman: I'm sorry. The whole screen just suddenly disappeared, and all I saw was a Zoom thing. Sorry about that, everybody. Okay. So, again, my name is Christin Kinman, and I tend to focus on security for houses of worship. I've spoken with EPN at your conferences and on several webinars, and I'm delighted to be back here. So to build off of what Tim has been saying, first, let's talk about what a secure voting location should do. As Tim aptly said, absolutely welcome every eligible voter with dignity, preserve that accessible orderly entry that's clearly marked, free of any obstructions, protect voting operations in space. And this is going to be something that will be different on this day and distinct from church-only spaces. So how do we secure those church-only spaces so that nobody can go wandering and do any kind of harm to our property?

And then, again, remain visibly nonpartisan. Nobody should be able to look at you and have a sense of where you stand on the political spectrum. There is a key distinction between election day and a typical Sunday or any other day during the week that you're welcoming people to your parishes. Sunday objectives: it's that radical, warm, opening, welcoming hospitality as opposed to election day objectives, which is we want to provide open access to voting areas, and we want to put up clear

boundaries for the rest of the campus. It takes all things working together to get to that safety and security place that everybody wants to be at.

So it's recognizing behaviors of concern, behavioral threat assessment management, providing limited access to our facilities, and having robust operational processes in place for election day that's going to help get you to that place of safety and security. When we talk about security decisions, there are a couple things that we don't want to make decisions based on. Obviously, political apparel or viewpoint. We don't want to be targeting someone for their apparent political leanings. Anything like race, gender, religious ideology, disability, immigration status, something that might be this person just looks unfamiliar. I've never seen him or her before. The poll workers haven't. That's very likely to have happened. That doesn't mean that they are a threat to you or something like homelessness, socioeconomic status, anything of that nature. We want to provide this standard of welcoming to all, neutral in politics, alert to behavior, and then finally, be prepared to act if you have to. Hopefully, none of you will ever have to go forward with the action piece.

So before you agree to have your place of worship be an election polling site, it's really important that you get into place a memorandum of understanding and even possibly a facility use document. These are two official documents that clearly delineate your policies, your process, your use of space, your key personnel, and any other details that you might need to include that's relative to your location. This memorandum of understanding should document a couple things, control being one of them. Who's controlling the polling room? Who's in charge? Who's the decision maker that day? And then who's controlling the rest of the space? What kind of operational decisions? How are they going to be governed?

So who's making operational decisions? Who's initiating security protocols if it's needed? This last one seems really self-explanatory, but honestly, research says it's not. Who was calling 911 if needed? Because there's this thing called the bystander effect where Tim thinks I'm calling 911, and I think Tim's calling 911, and no one's calling 911. So who is that clearly identified person? You can have other people doing it, but we want to make sure that there's at least one person. Communication. If something happens, who is the spokesperson? Who's going to communicate with voters and the media at large?

And then this other one that people don't often think about, but mass communications capability. And this is not just for something that could be an untoward hostile act. This could be because maybe somebody's having a medical emergency or there's a weather event, and you don't want people coming to your site that day because it's unsafe. We want to have some form of mass communications capability, and potentially even two-way communication or a public address system, for the people that are in the building so you can notify them if, for example, you're in an area where tornadoes are possible, that you need them to move to seek shelter and to be able to direct them to where that is. And then authorization.

Who's going to document any incidents, and who has that ultimate authority to initiate something like a lockdown in an evacuation or relocation? We want to make sure that we have really clear boundaries in place with this document. Election authorities are directly responsible for voting operations, and they should be the only people that are actually directing the people there for voting. The parish, though, directs people regarding the facility, the staff, the property, anything that's relative to the parish itself. And we don't want to blur these boundaries.

So name your people. Identify them in advance so that people can be referred to them, and your parish people know who it is on the election side, and the election people know who the appropriate spokesperson is on the parish side. What are some of the things that you should have in your memorandum of understanding? One, absolutely, you want to define exact responsibilities for use of the facility and those lead persons that we just talked about, both on the parish side and on the elections side.

You want to have some form of pre-election planning for election day, and you want to engage with your local first responders, public safety leaders, law enforcement, and you want to be able to provide them with these key names and contact information. And then finally, having a structured way for communication is also something that's very important. It helps eliminate ambiguity, and it ensures a common language that everybody understands. And the best mechanism for that is the incident command system, which is part of the NIMS or National Incident Management System framework. You can take two classes on using the incident command system through FEMA for free. If you just Google it online, it will come right up. You want to make sure that whoever's volunteering on the parish's behalf that day has had some training.

So we want to train them so that they very well understand. It's not your job to interpret election law. It is not your job to attempt to resolve any kind of voter eligibility dispute or to adjudicate political activity or to direct any poll workers unless they've been trained properly by the election authority. What volunteers do need to do, though, is be able to escalate a response immediately if there's any kind of threat, weapon present, stalking behavior, forced entry, anything like that. If something like that were to emerge, your volunteers need to be trained to know what to do, who to go to, and where to go.

And then, again, to follow up on what Tim was saying, to be alert to behavioral indicators and the language and the cues that might be being given off by a particular individual. What does pre-election planning look like? Well, I say you want to be joined at the hip with your local law enforcement and life safety or trauma EMS responders. What does that look like? Well, I would invite them in to do a site visit. I would invite them to do a little bit of a vulnerability analysis. It doesn't have to be a formal threat assessment. Just identify where they see vulnerabilities at your location. You want to be able to ensure that they know exactly where your critical infrastructure is located.

So where's the boiler room? Where is your primary electrical service coming in? Where's the gas shutoff? And then you want to ask them, hey, what are the potential localized threats that I don't know about that might affect my facility? Because one thing that you need to remember is that risk is regional and contextual. What is a threat or vulnerability that might happen for Tim's parish in Minneapolis versus what's happening in New York City is going to look very different because your environments are very different. So ask them, what are the things that you guys know about in our tracking that I don't so that if something were to manifest, you'd be prepared. Doing some very rudimentary basic emergency planning where you're focusing on an all-hazards response, meaning not just a volatile person coming in with a grievance, but could be a medical emergency. It could be somebody that gets confused with reverse and drive, and they've parked up against your building, and all of a sudden, they're inside of your building in your car.

It could be anything like that. It could be a weather-related event. It could be maybe you are geographically proximate to a highway or a railroad or critical infrastructure that if there's a derailment or a major accident, it's going to snarl things up for you. So

what do you need to plan for? And then having that very clearly delineated process for reporting any kind of concerning behavior.

On the communication side, we want to have already implemented some form of communication between election officials and church personnel. And that could be in the form of maybe just a very cheap pair of Motorola walkie-talkies back and forth. It could be designated people with charged cell phones. It could be a communications app like Slack. And then you want to have some form of a rudimentary mass communication plan in place in case any of those events that you've identified and planned for came to be.

These should just be some prescripted, simple, clear, direct mass communication notifications. And then the last thing that I think is one of the most important things that I wish I could get people on board with is exercising the plan in advance. You do not have to wait for a crisis to hit your location to exercise your emergency operations and incident command structure. It can be for any event. So an event like election day, it could be Christmas Eve when you have a lot of people coming to your parish. It could be your fall festival, whatever. But you want to exercise it and stress test your plan in advance.

Why? Because there are going to be blind spots that you miss. And when you exercise this plan, you will be very shocked at how quickly you think to yourself, why didn't I think about this? So you want to identify those gaps and disconnects that might be there in advance. And then if something comes up in your training that is a need that is previously unidentified, you want to be able to identify it, understand it, and work to mitigate it. The whole goal here is to eliminate surprises. You want to expect the worst, to plan for the worst, and hope for the best, which most of the time, it's the best that happens. It's not the worst.

I'm going to talk through a little bit about environmental security. And all of this information, honestly, applies for every day, not just election day. There's a framework called crime prevention through environmental design, or commonly known as CPTED, that offers some principles to enhance security without making your facility look like it's a fortified prison that is unwelcoming to outsiders. There's basically four basic tenets: natural surveillance, natural access control, territoriality, and then maintenance.

So natural surveillance is about being able to see when you are inside your facility what is happening on your property around. So you've got these clear lines of sight. How do you do that? Appropriate lighting, appropriate landscaping. So for the landscaping, what I mean by that is you want to keep any kind of shrubs cut back really low. 2 feet is optimal, 3 feet maybe, but at no time do you want any shrubbery blocking your ability to see. You don't want that shrubbery having the ability for people to hide contraband or persons in that shrubbery. For trees, you want to keep the canopy of your trees trimmed all the way up to a minimum of 8 feet. If you have cameras, you want to make sure that those cameras are actually not blocked by things like landscaping. They aren't affected by something like low lighting.

So you've got a camera, but it's not able to detect anything. Natural access control has to do with how people are able to access your site. So this is going to be things like wayfinding signage. Signage is something that is so overlooked by many people. And honestly, it is one of the cheapest, most effective ways to move people through your site in a way that you want them to and to actually deter unwanted behavior.

So wayfinding signage. And if you don't have formal wayfinding signage for the election, it's fine. Do something temporary. It doesn't have to cost a lot of money. As long as it's directing people through your property the way you want them to approach your property, you're doing great. We want to have clearly defined pathways. We want our access points, so, like, where we enter and exit to be near areas where those areas can be surveyed naturally so that we can see what's coming at us, see what's leaving our building.

Territoriality is really about defining ownership. So it's having these clearly defined zones. What's the public space, the semi-public, and the private? So what do I mean by that? So likely, you've got a campus that has a road running in front of your campus, and that road may have a sidewalk, for example. Anybody can be on that sidewalk. It's the public right of way. Anyone can be there for any reason. But the minute I step off that sidewalk and onto your property grounds, I'm now in semi-public space. I may have a legitimate reason for being there, and I may not. And then by the time you get to your private space, which is the envelope of your building, that should only be legitimate use and users that are approaching that area. You want to be able to see people coming at you, make a judgment as to whether or not they're there for legitimate purposes, and they're using the space in legitimate ways.

And then finally, and this one is really a basic one, it's maintenance. So what do I mean by that? A site that looks tended and cared for is a huge deterrent to someone wishing to do harm because they are saying to themselves, someone's paying attention. And when someone's paying attention, my risk or reward ratio for doing something untoward suddenly starts to diminish. So having things like all of the trash that is maybe collecting in a corner on the back of your property, clear it out. Get rid of it. Make sure that your bathrooms are nice and tidy and clean. Some of you have very old facilities, and they might be from the 1950s. I worked with a lot of parishes that were like that. As long as they're clean and they're not trashed, you're doing great. Making sure that all the paths inside of your building and outside of your building are unobstructed by anything that's going to prevent ingress or egress in any way. And then finally, having a rapid breakdown after an event so people very clearly know it's over. We're done. It's time to go home, and you want to return to normal operations as quickly as possible. So just some real quick takeaways.

Exchange phone numbers, define your decision authority, review your entrances and exits, agree on the reporting pathway that you are putting in place. So when we talk about physical access, here are things that you do want to do. And you can see the red rectangle where it says entrance. So have that clearly marked designated entrance so there's no confusion about how you should be accessing the site and your polling place.

That route should be a route that is handicap accessible. And if your main entrance is not handicap accessible, identifying where that is and clearly notating it. Designate where the polling places are versus where the parish or the parish property where that part of the facility comes into play. Identifying the restrooms that are appropriate for election day and making sure nobody can get to the other ones. Having adequate directional signage, having ways to segregate voters from visitors.

And then here's the other big one. Before election day comes, as a parish, you want to communicate often and clearly about what is going to happen, how the parish is going to be utilized, what spaces are going to be utilized, and also just say, look, this is not a day that we want to have a whole bunch of people coming to campus. So if you're planning the women's prayer group or the men's group is having a retreat, pick an alternate day, pick an alternate time. You want to minimize maintenance, repair work, and the extra visitors on your site for that day.

You also want to make sure you are restricting places like your office, your church. If you are running any kind of a school or child care center, that absolutely has to be secured and segregated. Common areas. So a lot of places will have things like kitchens, gymnasiums, auditoriums, anything like that. Make sure they're secured. Absolutely make sure that any critical infrastructure is secured at all times. No one's going in and out of those spaces. So that could be IT, mechanical, electrical, gas, anything like that needs to be secured that day. When we talk about territoriality and maintenance, I have a couple different things marked. We're going to talk about that.

So, again, we've sort of already covered this, having that direct pathway for people to enter in the right way, making sure that there's no debris, clutter, or anything that can be blocking ingress and egress. Remember, now we're in August, so we're not necessarily thinking about darkness. And in November, daylight savings time has ended. It is going to be dark early, polling places often don't close till 8 or 9:00. So if you've got a parking lot and you've got burnt out bulbs or if you have wallpacks around the perimeter of your building that have burnt out bulbs, you want to make sure that all of that is taken care of because you want people to safely be able to identify threats. 20 feet is the recommendation. I want to be able to clearly identify from 20 feet away and assess whether that person is potentially a threat to me or not.

Lock up any kind of religious articles or valuables. Make sure you're securing any sensitive data and systems. And then if needed, you want to use some kind of barrier fencing or to be supportive of the environment, not to fortify it. But what do I mean by this?

So I have worked with parishes where their parking literally abuts their parish center. And so an elderly person that gets confused between drive and reverse can veer, and I've actually dealt with this. They get confused, and they drive into your building. Or it could be someone having a medical emergency, like a heart attack. They could run into your building.

So what do we do? We try and fortify the perimeter with decorative planters, bollards, fencing, anything like that that is not just for decorative purposes. It actually has structural integrity and value to it so that if somebody does hit it, it's going to slow somebody down. The other two red boxes that I have, really, they're illustrating the point about landscaping, keeping those shrubs really low, trimming that tree canopy. The tree actually is not done well in this illustration. That tree canopy, you can see, is

blocking the window behind it. So thinning that out, trimming that tree canopy, those are the things you want to be looking at.

People ask a lot about cameras. Cameras can do a lot for us, but they also have their limitations. If you've got cameras on the exterior, your goal there is to be observing the parking lot, the entrances, and pathways. Most church staffs do not have people monitoring cameras in real-time. If that is you, you need to understand the security value that cameras are going to add to you. They're a great risk management tool. They're a great way to access data about an incident after it happens. But these are not in real-time being monitored cameras most of the time. So don't just think that you've got a free pass because you've got cameras.

The other reason that they can be used for is risk management. Let's say somebody falls, and they're claiming that it was negligent on the part of the property owner. If you've got cameras there, that can be assessed for insurance purposes. Again, it can be used for evidence post-event to be provided to law enforcement. You do, however, want to restrict or revise the locations of cameras temporarily on election day if in any way they could be zeroing in on voters or even zeroing in on a ballot. We don't want to assume that someone there just is automatically there for nefarious intent to a way that we're using cameras to conduct targeted monitoring.

So most of the people that are going to be coming to your sites are not people intending to do harm. Most people are good. And sometimes we get so caught up in the security conversation, and it can make people feel a little bit more unsafe than I would want them to feel. It's just good to have a reminder. Most people are not there to do harm. They're there because they're coming to churches because churches are like the field hospital for the broken. And so if you have somebody coming in that looks disheveled and haphazard and maybe shouldn't be there at that right time, most of the time, they're not there to do harm. Most of the time, they're there so that somebody just sees them and values them as a human. So just don't lose sight of that is the only takeaway there.

So on election day, you want to streamline your parish operations. You want to have communicated to your parish at large multiple times. This is happening. People are coming. We want to not put things on our docket for that day. We don't want extraneous people. You want to make sure that your poll workers are clearly defined with badges, and that should come from the election commission, not the parish. But

church personnel should have some badging, and it should say, you know, Saint Mark's Episcopal Church. And then maybe your name, maybe your picture, maybe your title. I'm the director of operations. I'm the business manager, whatever. You want to have that segregation of voters from visitors.

So, again, restricting parish operations and events on that day only. We want to do things like limiting maintenance. We want to restrict access by outside vendors, technicians, etc. And then if somebody is coming for the parish and not for election things, you want to be able to just have a clear check-in process. You want to know who's been accessing your site on the parish side on that day. And again, we want to maintain this image of complete neutrality. We want to be Geneva. Avoid any kind of church messaging, slogans, partisan colors, anything that could potentially construe endorsement and trigger people. We just want to be as neutral as possible on this day.

And then this is also where the training process is really important because a lot of times, people say, oh, we're going to have a process in place, but you don't really think through the process. You don't really identify the people. If someone needs help, if someone is legitimately concerned, what's the process? How do you triage it? It could be a routine concern. Where can I find x? Who can help me with y? How do you know who's in charge of that? Who's in charge of answering those questions and the process for finding those answers?

And they could be something as simple as, how do I get to the bathroom? I have my 98-year-old mother with me, and she needs help. How can you help me get her into it? That's fine. Then we have sort of an escalating concern. I noticed x person exhibiting y behavior, and I'm feeling uncomfortable. Who is in charge to know what to do, where to go, what those next steps are? And really, that next step should just be like what Tim is talking about with the power of hello. Hi. Thank you for coming to St. Mark's today. How can I help you? Do you need any assistance finding your way over to the election polling place? Something basic like that.

And then maybe there's an immediate danger. X is occurring right now, and we need immediate help. Who is responsible? Who's making that phone call to 911? Who is trying to secure the scene? Who's trying to get people to safety if it turns into something like an evacuation, a lockdown, a shelter in place? And remember, this is not always for nefarious intent. It could be a tornado. It could be any number of

things, a health emergency. And again, that element of having mass communication capability is really important.

Key information that everybody who's working that day needs to have. Site-wide communication. Who's got those two-way radios, charged phones, mass communication duties, who's running the Slack and monitoring the Slack channel. Everybody needs to know what is the building address and the precise entrance for law enforcement or for EMS to access the facility in the case of an emergency. That is something that you want to go over well before election day. You want to decide on a common language. This is why the incident command system is so helpful because it does give you very common language that everybody understands. It's quick. It's clear. It's unambiguous.

The one thing you do not ever want to do is use some kind of code word. Mr. Smith has entered the building. When you're hearing that, you're like, wait. What was who's Mr. Smith? What does that mean? No. We want to eliminate any kind of ambiguity, questioning. If you need to start a lockdown, you just say, we are initiating a lockdown. You are to move to x location. It's short. It's quick. It's concise. Everybody understands it. And then having a phone directory on hand.

How do I get in touch with the election office, the church office? Maybe it's just the local precinct. I don't necessarily have an emergency, but people are feeling a little uncomfortable. Could you just send somebody over to monitor? Again, the goal here, try to eliminate as much ambiguity as possible. Plan for the worst. Anticipate the best. Very quickly, train your volunteers on how to take a good report. Quick questions for maximum information. Eliminate the vagueness and the ambiguity.

Who was involved? Who was notified? What was seen or heard? What was concerning about it? What action was taken? When did the event occur? Where did the event occur? If you answer those things, that is such a treasure trove of information. You just want to avoid collecting really ambiguous information like Tim was alluding to. Like, somebody was doing something that made me feel uncomfortable, or this person looked funny to me because he's an immigrant. Whatever it is, it could be anything. We want to take that ambiguity out. We want to clearly say, okay. Who/what are you concerned about? Where did it happen? What happened? Who was involved? And so on. We can go on to the next one.

Ultimately, what are we trying to do? It's really a cycle. We want to put physical security measures in place with clear operational directives and assignments with clearly identified workers and a reporting structure that then brings in all of the behavioral threat assessment and management tools and skills that we have. And then we just continue the cycle. The goal is to ultimately just provide that safe, welcoming environment for everyone to come to exercise their constitutional right to vote free from harm, fear, or intimidation. And I think we have three minutes left. So if anybody has any questions, we can take that. I'm not seeing anything, I don't think, in the chat right now. So we may be at the natural conclusion.

Tim Kingsley: Well, thank you, Christin. It's been a pleasure to present with you today, and thank you to everybody that participated and came to the seminar today. If you have any questions, we can be reached through EPN, and the slides will be available to all. Thank you so very much, and have a blessed day.

Christin Kinman: Bye bye.